(DOWNLOAD) "Lynch v. Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust" by Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts * Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Lynch v. Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust
- Author : Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
- Release Date : January 09, 1938
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 69 KB
Description
RUGG, Chief Justice. This is a bill of exceptions respecting the allowance of two petitions to vacate judgments entered, in favor of the defendant, pursuant to rescripts from this court in Lynch v. Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co., Mass., 200 N.E. 914. Those were actions of tort to recover compensation for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiffs through the gross negligence of one Gimbel, the defendant's intestate, in driving his automobile. Gimbel was killed in the same accident. Each petition alleged that the accident occurred on May 13, 1932. The verdict in each case in the original trial was for the plaintiff in a substantial sum. Those verdicts were set aside and judgments in favor of the defendant were ordered by this court in the decision just cited on March 31, 1936. Subsequently, in July, 1936, these petitions to vacate those judgments on the ground of newly discovered evidence were filed by the plaintiffs in those actions. The newly discovered evidence tended to show that the conduct of Gimbel was grossly negligent and was caused, in part at least, by the excessive use of intoxicating liquor by him just prior to the accident, and that such evidence was not available at the time of the original trial. The newly discovered evidence was found by the trial Judge to be material. These petitions were heard at large upon the merits in the Superior Court. There was further evidence that the estate of Gimbel was represented insolvent on April 14, 1935, and that distribution of his estate was made before the petitions at bar were filed. Decree allowing distribution was dated May 15, 1936. In general, pleadings are not necessary in proceedings like the present. Wrinn v. Sellers, 252 Mass. 423, 425, 147 N.E. 899; Thomajanian v. Odabshian, 272 Mass. 19, 23, 172 N.E. 232; Hastings v. Parker, 168 Mass. 445, 47 N.E. 194. It follows that it was not necessary to plead the statute of limitations. Therefore, it is of no consequence that the respondent filed no answers. The petitions were tried on the theory that all issues were open. The petitions to vacate judgment were allowed, subject to the exceptions of the respondent.